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The paper concerns the problem of the mythological origins of narrative and narrative identity. 
Referring to works of such narrative researchers as D. Carr, B. Williams and K. Atkins and to 
F.W.J. Schelling’s conception of a mythological consciousness, I prove that 1. in a narration – per-
sonal as well as collective (in a tale which constitutes given culture) – the type of necessity is simi-
lar to that which occurs in nature as well as in mythology (its higher potential) and which is respon-
sible for a perfect story coherence that is unavailable in normal life and characteristic rather of art 
than of a usual experience; 2. although our personal narratives are shaped on the basis of a collec-
tive myth, they assume a first-person, reflective perspective, and this is the reason why an individ-
ual may in spite of such to some extent “untrue” origins keep personal freedom and autonomy. 
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Over the last thirty or forty years, the concept of narrative and the related problem of 
narrative identity became very popular in many branches of various sciences – typi-
cally humanities, including literature or philosophy, as well as, for example, medical 
and social sciences and so on. There are several reasons for the wide interest in this 
question, previously treated rather as part of fictional, literary discourse, but one in 
particular seems to be the most important. The narrative may be a valuable methodo-
logical proposal in all those sciences in which humans are not only subjects conduct-
ing research but also objects of the conducted research – which may be a consequence 
of the fact that telling stories is one of the most human of all human activities, taking 
place all over the world in every historical time, every culture and every society.




In this paper I would like to prove the thesis that both narrative and narrative iden-
tity, that is to say a story (narration) concerning somebody’s life, have the same ori-
gins as myth and mythology. I would like to show that they can be treated as at least 
partially produced by the mythological consciousness described by F.W.J. Schelling 
in his Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, which appears especially in the po-
etical, ideal coherence characteristic of narrative structure and absent in normal life, 
which unites events in a perfect but at the same time fictional way. I would also like 
to answer the question of why this coherence may contradict such values as truth, 
human autonomy and individual freedom of choice, and why in spite of this our 
personal life-story may overcome such a danger of reducing ourselves to a part of 
a mythical tale. 
Every narrative – fictional as well as “real” – has one important feature which is 
constitutive for it and without which it would not be possible to tell any story. This 
special quality is related to its aesthetic, artificial character, which is a consequence of 
the fact that each narration must be coherent, because without this it makes no sense 
to the reader or listener. As Katrina McNeely Farren puts it, according to Ricoeur’s 
views every narrative joins discordant, “(...) random events that are constantly occur-
ring (...)” in the so-called real life of an individual or community, giving them a con-
cordance which finally “(...) wins out over discordance (...),”1 and such a “discordant 
concordance” is its most important, key attribute. In doing so, it changes accidental, 
empirical events, giving them a form of something like a work, a piece of art which 
many philosophers believe does not exist in reality, or even if exists to some extent, 
it does not look exactly like a ready whole, a complete story-to-be-told. As David 
Carr puts it, many “philosophers, literary theorists, and historians” are convinced 
that “Real events simply do not hang together in a narrative way, and if we treat them 
as if they did we are being untrue to life. Thus not merely for lack of evidence or of 
verisimilitude, but in virtue of its very form, any narrative account will present us 
with a distorted picture of the events it relates (...).”2 Further, he adds a few remarks 
to clarify this poetical transformation towards an aesthetical whole, which is quite 
utopian from the point of view of real life: “(...) a narrative unites many actions to 
form a plot. The resulting whole is often still designated, however, to be an action of 
larger scale: coming of age, conducting a love affair, or solving a murder.”3 
In short, every narrative – even the “truest” story of our own life or an eye-witness 
testimony to some real events – is to some extent “poetical” and “fictional,” because 
this is a complete whole with a beginning, middle and end and must be told accord-
ing to some precisely determined rules so as an activity which imitates a reality and 
has its own poetics it belongs to an art in the Aristotelian sense of this term. From 
this point of view there is no clear difference between a fictional narrative concern-
1 K. McNeely Farren, Narrative Identity in Paul Ricoeur and Luce Irigaray: The Circularity Between 
Self and Other, Houghton, MI 2010, http://gradworks.umi.com/3403377.pdf [access: 1.11.2014], 
p. 82. About Ricoeur’s idea of so-called discordant concordance see also P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 
vol. 1, trans. by K. McLaughlin, D. Pellauer, Chicago-London 1984, p. 38 and further. 
2 D. Carr, Narrative and the Real World: an Argument for Continuity [in:] “History and Theory,” 
1986, vol. 25, no. 2 (May), p. 117. 
3 Ibidem, p. 122. 
297
ing characters invented by a novelist – such as the count of Monte Cristo, Jane Eyre 
or Julien Sorel – and a true narration concerning for example the life of any famous 
historical hero, like Joan of Arc, Elizabeth I or Christopher Columbus, and we can 
say that a given story is fictional or true only because we know which of them refers 
to real, empirical facts.
Philosophers and theorists conducting research concerning narrative – especially 
those who are to some extent sceptical to the idea that there is an ideal equivalence 
between narration on the one side and the real events it relates on the other – claim 
that in a story – even one which aspires to be true – we always find something like 
a perfect, poetical coherence which does not exist in normal, everyday life. Stories 
are always told after, when everything has already happened, and those who tell them 
are very clever because they know how the given story finishes. In the moment of 
shaping the narrative, they have knowledge which was completely unavailable to 
them when the given events were occurring. From such a perspective, everything 
looks more coherent, more understandable, more clear – in such a way that we can 
be convinced that everything had to lead to exactly such an end which really took 
place. This may, though, be only our subjective illusion, because there is no proof that 
those particular events could not have had any other (or even more than one) course 
and – perhaps more importantly – a completely different ending. In short, there is an 
anxiety that in creating our story we are not only giving a faithful account but – just 
because this is an imitation, a kind of complete whole which has a definite form – are 
also imposing upon the empirical facts something like a poetical, fictional order using 
ready narrative schemes and patterns which do not exist in reality and which are “(...) 
derived from the act of telling the story, not from the events themselves.”4
As Bernard Williams puts it, “There are some particular worries (...) about the 
status of the coherence that is given to a life by a narrative structure; we need to ask 
whether the ‘inevitability’ that may be conveyed by a narrative, and the capacity of 
narratives to represent some developmental sequences as coherent while others seem 
arbitrary or inexplicable, may not express some other, external, kinds of constraint, 
tacitly appealing to a power which is not simply that (...) of the truth.”5 Elsewhere, he 
suggests that such a fit “seems like magic.”6
Such a “magical,” poetical coherence is related to the social and cultural origins 
of narration. In his famous analysis of the Russian folk tale, Propp claims that such 
a primary, folk narrative is based upon a common, recurrent scheme which always 
consists of a couple of typical heroes and a few types of activity related to them, 
united in sequences of a plot which follow each other according to precisely defined 
rules that are always the same. As a consequence, such stories resemble each other to 
a very high degree. Propp explains this recurrence by referring to their origin – as he 
puts it, at the very beginning they were neither a literature nor an art, but rather part 
of a common myth constitutive to a given community and the text of a tale – a recur-
4 Ibidem, p. 118. 
5 B. Williams, Life as Narrative [in:] “European Journal of Philosophy” 2009, vol. 17 (2), p. 308. 
6 Ibidem, p. 312. 
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rent sequence of typical activities – probably imitating a succession of some mythical 
operations which belonged to an ancient, forgotten ritual.7 
In short, what we see in such a tale is not a typical, Aristotelian imitation of real 
beings or events, but rather an imitation of a ritual, possibly with a kind of a ritual or 
a myth itself – and that is the reason for this ideal, “magical” coherence which unites 
the successive episodes of a given story and which does not exist in a normal life. In 
other words, such an ideal, poetical whole is available only because in a narration we 
still partially have a mythical consciousness which has produced and shaped myth, 
mythical images and collective rituals, and in such a way also gave the basis for all 
creative activities like, for example, poetry, art or storytelling. 
I would now like to define a term mentioned above. According to Schelling’s 
late philosophy, so-called mythological consciousness is a higher potention of a na-
ture productive process – speaking more precisely, it is a nature productive process 
which takes place in human consciousness. This is the reason why mythology – the 
primordial collective tales which are the basis of all cultures or communities – has 
the greatest reality, and is not “invented” or imagined by people who decide freely 
which image or which motif should become a part of such a collective myth or ritual 
and which should be discarded, for example for being too ugly or too cruel. Instead, 
it is equally essential and necessary as nature itself. As Schelling puts it in his Intro-
duction to the Philosophy of Mythology, “(...) mythology has no reality (...) outside 
of consciousness; but if it only takes its course in the determinations of conscious-
ness, that is, in its representations, then (...) this cour se  o f  even t s ,  t h i s  suc-
ces s ion  o f  r ep resen ta t ions  themse lves cannot again be such a one that is 
merely imag ined; it must have ac tua l ly taken place, must have actually occurred 
in consciousness (...). This succession is not fashioned by mythology, but rather (...) 
mythology is fashioned by it.”8 
Greek mythology, which for Schelling is “one and the same” as Homer, provides 
us with a very good example of this necessary, symbolic character of a mythological 
process. As he puts it in The Philosophy of Art, “The origin of mythology and the 
origin of Homer (...) coincide”9 because Homer was “(...) already involved in the first 
poetic products of mythology and was, as it were, potentially present” and “already 
spiritually – archetypally – predetermined.”10 In other words, although the name of 
a person who is supposed to be an author of a Greek mythological tale is very well 
7 Such a conclusion corresponds well with the conviction, very popular among such narrative think-
ers as Mary-Louise Pratt, Thomas Leitch, Monika Fludernik, David Herman, Marie-Laure Ryan or Mi-
chael Kearns, that such terms as narrative and fictive “might better be seen as describing acts rather 
than objects, discursive processes whose determinations are constituted by a community’s ways of using 
them, not by a text intrinsic formal features (...)” and that “They are not discovered intrinsic elements 
but extrinsic learned behaviours, tacit rules and explanatory stances that allow the interpreter to decide 
what elements or patterns are required to confer story status on a given phenomenon (...)”; M. Kreiswirth, 
Narrative Turn in the Humanities [in:] Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, D. Herman, M. Jahn 
and M.-L. Ryan (eds.), London–New York 2010, p. 381.
8 F.W.J. Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, trans. M. Richey, 
M. Zisselsberger, New York 2007, p. 89. 
9 F.W.J. Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. D.W. Scott, Minneapolis 1989, p. 52. 
10 Ibidem, p. 52. 
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known, as a matter of fact mythology does not have one individual, precisely deter-
mined originator. Like every collective narration, it was created rather by a whole 
community, by many people speaking in one unanimous voice. As Schelling himself 
puts it, “(...) Mythology can be neither the work of an individual person nor of a col-
lectivity nor of the race (to the extent that the latter is merely a composite of indi-
viduals), but rather exclusively of the collectivity to the extent that it itself constitutes 
an individual and is the equal of an individual person.”11 This collective author was 
“seized by one thought,” despite not having a reflective, individual consciousness. At 
the moment when mythology was generated, people were not thinking rationally and 
were acting under the influence of something like ecstasy, were possessed by some-
thing akin to a Dionysian passion, a higher spiritual inspiration. 
In other words, a mythology concerns something universal, at least within the lim-
its of a given culture or community. Problems presented by this collective author(s), 
speaking through the medium of a mythological narration, are never related to one 
particular, individual person, but are always to some extent common. In such a col-
lective tale, we are dealing with typical, sometimes archetypal relations, feelings, the 
most popular and most frequent attitudes towards a few universal situations all peo-
ple sometimes have to face up to – love, death, suffering, grief, life and so on. Using 
the language of poetical images, figures of gods, heroes and people endowed with 
extraordinary, divine advantages or skills, a mythology tells a story which is maybe 
not a truth in an empirical sense of this term, but nevertheless remains important to 
community members as a kind of pronouncement which has a higher poetical reality 
and bears key values and ideas constitutive to a given culture. 
What is the relationship between a mythology and a narrative? Are these two dif-
ferent types of expression, or perhaps one and the same type? Is mythology a kind of 
narrative, or rather only a source of every single story, which reveals some similari-
ties to it despite at the same time remaining a completely separate whole existing 
according to a totally independent rule? 
According to Schelling’s views, a mythology founds the basis on which various 
particular mythological stories, tales and plots grow. As he claims in his Philosophy 
of Art, it provides an artist or a poet with material for his work and so-called private 
mythology. 12 Some other authors – such as Emily Lyle or Alan Dundes – are con-
vinced that a myth itself is also a specific form of “sacred narrative” which “does 
carry us back into (...) a deeper prehistory than has been reached through the study of 
Indo-European languages”13 (Lyle) or which explains “how the world and man came 
to be in their present form” 14 (Dundes). In other words, this is also a kind of a narra-
11 Ibidem, p. 51.
12 As he puts it, “(...) every great poet is called to structure from this evolving (mythological) world, 
a world of which his own age can reveal to him only a part. I repeat: from this world he is to structure into 
a whole that particular part revealed to him, and to create from the content and substance of that world his 
mythology (...)”; F.W.J. Schelling, The Philosophy of Art..., p. 74. 
13 E. Lyle, “Narrative Form and the Structure of Myth” [in:] “Folklore. Electronic Journal of Folk-
lore,” 2006, vol. 33, p. 59 (see: http://www.folklore.ee/folklore/vol33/lyle.pdf).
14 A. Dundes, Introduction [in:] Sacred Narrative. Readings in the Theory of Myth, A. Dundes (ed.), 
Berkeley–Los Angeles–London 1984, p. 1. 
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tion, but of a very special type – as Theodor H. Gaster puts it, it is not “(...) just any 
story of the supranatural that happens to be believed. It is a story that gives verbal 
expression to the Mythic Idea; in practical terms a story that is specifically associ-
ated with a cultic situation (...).”15 And, as he adds further, “By means of this more 
limited definition the obstinate problem of what distinguishes a myth from a tale is 
at once resolved. The difference lies (...) in their function and motivation. A myth is, 
or once was, used; a tale is, and always was, merely told. The former presupposes an 
actual or original counterpart in cultic performance; the latter does not.”16 
In all the conceptions mentioned above, mythological narration is treated as older 
and as a consequence more fundamental (more genuine to some extent), because as 
a myth it is closer to a primordial ritual which gives a direct approach to an original 
truth, to the ideal, poetical matter of all discourses (a universal ocean of poetry, as 
Schelling puts it in the last chapter of his System of a Transcendental Idealism). In 
spite of this, though, it also remains a story, even if this is not an ordinary, but a sacred, 
holy tale. This is a reason why although mythology is not exactly the same as a usual 
narrative their sources are to some extent common – just because both of them consti-
tute some kind of a story, a tale which may be told. Moreover, the latter is only a less 
symbolic, more rational and logical, more simple and univocal17 version of the former. 
They take their truth and their proper matter from a primordial myth, from 
a mythical past when people were possessed by a mythological consciousness. These 
circumstances related to their origins are one of the most important causes of – as 
mentioned above – such a magical, ideal coherence of a story, elements of which 
are such discourse universals as ready narrative patterns, expectations which always 
come true and so on. Every story which is going to be complete and coherent needs 
such knots in the plot which gather together various events and facts, thus present-
ing them as a part of a greater whole. Simple models of understanding which let us 
know in advance that something has to happen exactly in a way assumed by a given 
pattern or cultural model and which force us to consider the given circumstances, 
random facts or actions such as a love affair, professional negotiations or an attempt 
to find somebody’s own place in life, are necessary in a narration, because just such 
universals, prior to every possible experience patterns or narrative categories, create 
a discordant concordance which according to Ricoeur’s views is the source of mean-
ing in a story. In other words, in every narrative as well as in every myth and cultural 
record there are such – sometimes very far from empirical facts and prior to them 
– convictions which as a matter of fact are what shapes the story and push it further, 
although maybe they are, as Williams puts it, “(...) the power which is not simply that 
(...) of the truth (...)”18 – and as a consequence that of the reflective thought or a typi-
cal scientific discourse. 
15 T.H. Gaster, Myth and Story [in:] Sacred Narrative..., p. 123. 
16 Ibidem, p. 123. 
17 Of course, this does not mean that a usual narration always has only one meaning and cannot carry 
a symbolical record at all – for example, it is well known that all valuable literary fictitious narratives can 
also be also read on different levels and give various possibilities of interpretation – just because they are 
not and cannot be univocal.
18 B. Williams, op.cit., p. 308. 
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In my opinion, Schelling’s philosophy of mythology and revelation may provide 
us with the best explanation of this “unreflective” character of a narration. The power 
which unites successive events is not “that of the truth.” This is because what we 
have here is not only or mainly a usual discourse which consists of statements and 
sentences referring to facts in a way described by, for example, positivist philoso-
phers, but rather something created like a piece of art, or rather generated like a myth, 
by a mythological consciousness which does not depict a reality but creates its own 
world in human consciousness using the same creative forces (potentions) which 
are also true, real sources of a nature itself. In short, this is simply a power of na-
ture which acts in human consciousness, and this is a reason why the answers and 
schemes of understanding proposed by a narration and imposed by it on real events 
are sometimes such irrefutable and necessary, “magical” and giving associations with 
a constraint received by an individual as violating his or her personal autonomy and 
freedom of choice. 
It is necessary now to say a few words about narrative identity. First of all I would 
like to define this term, which does not have a long history or tradition in philosophi-
cal discourse and appeared towards the end of the last century, in the early 1980s 
(although some philosophers – for example Wilhelm Schapp or Hannah Arendt – also 
applied it earlier, but only on a smaller scale and less pointedly). 
There are especially three thinkers whose works are important for understand-
ing what exactly narrative identity is – Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Paul 
Ricoeur. For example, according to MacIntyre’s views, it is “(...) a concept of a self 
whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as 
narrative beginning to middle to end. (...) we understand our own lives in terms of the 
narratives that we live out.”19 Ricoeur puts it even more explicitly in the Conclusion 
to the third part of Time and Narrative, where he writes the following words: “What 
justifies our taking the subject of an action, so designated by his, her, or its proper 
name, as the same throughout a life that stretches from birth to death? The answer has 
to be narrative. To answer the question ‘Who?’ as Hannah Arendt has so forcefully 
put it, is to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the ‘who’. 
And the identity of this ‘who’ therefore itself must be a narrative identity.”20 
In other words, a narrative identity is somebody’s life-story which constitutes 
somebody’s self and personal identity, and is one and the same thing as the manner 
in which he or she understands who he or she is. Such an individual, private story 
may be a trusty copy of a typical pattern of personality most popular in a given com-
munity, as for example MacIntyre puts it. He is convinced that an individual can 
only faithfully follow the traditions and schemes of behaviour he or she inherits and 
in such a way shares with his/her ancestors, and that as a matter of fact it is impos-
sible to invent here something really new and original, refuting the sometimes hard 
and inwardly contradictory heritage of our common past which shaped our identity. 
19 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Indiana 1984, pp. 205, 212. 
20 P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, trans. K. Blamey, D. Pellauer, Chicago–London 1988, 
p. 246. 
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This is not the only possible answer, because according to such thinkers as Taylor, 
although a community with all patterns of personality available somewhere is very 
important in our becoming ourselves, an individual always has a free choice and 
can autonomously make so-called qualitative distinctions and choose who he or she 
wants to be, which values are the most important for his/her life and his/her own, 
private narration. 
Irrespective of which of these possibilities is closer to our own intuitions concern-
ing the way in which we become who we are, there is no doubt that an idea which 
lets us consider culture and individual identity as two sides of one and the same coin 
is widespread in the humanities and social sciences. Many philosophers as well as 
anthropologists will surely agree with the thesis expressed above, that our personal 
story (narration) may be shaped only on the basis of a collective tale which is one 
and the same thing as our culture. Secondly – and perhaps more importantly – that as 
a consequence our narrative identity is nothing more than a special, particular, rich 
or less so, interesting and individual or less so, but only a version of such a com-
mon mythology that is very hard to understand really deeply and properly without 
its particular primordial, social context. As Ruth Benedict puts it, “The large corpo-
rate behaviour (...) is nevertheless a behaviour of individuals. (...) In reality, society 
and the individual are not antagonists. His culture provides the raw material of which 
the individual makes his life. If it is meagre, the individual suffers; if it is rich, the 
individual has a chance to rise to his opportunity. Every private interest of every man 
and woman is served by the enrichment of the traditional stores of his civilization. 
The richest musical sensitivity can operate only within the equipment of standards of 
its tradition. It will add, perhaps importantly, to that tradition, but its achievements 
remains in proportion to the instruments and musical theory which the culture has 
provided.”21 
The last question I would like to consider concerns the problem of whether, and if so, 
how, such partially “untrue,” mythical origins of our personal life-story may influ-
ence such key ethical values important to the individual as freedom of choice, moral 
autonomy or dignity. If our personal identity as well as our culture and everything 
belonging to it – every work, every story, and even every type of discourse, includ-
ing – although it may sound like a paradox – that of science and truth, are only a kind 
of “well shaped tale to potential narrators of it,”22 are we still able to speak about any 
real world or reality as opposed to fiction or treat such moral universals as freedom, 
dignity or justice as something more than part of somebody’s private narration? Or, 
in other words, do we still have the duty to tell the truth, the opportunity to do it, 
and are we still free in a world in which practically everything, including our own 
personality, our idea of who we are, is “constructed” like a piece of art and is only an 
element of an individual or collective story, a by-product and a distant derivative of 
a collective, social myth? 
21 R. Benedict, Patterns of Culture, Boston 1959, pp. 251–252. 
22 B. Williams, op.cit., p. 313. 
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First of all, we must underline that there is no agreement among researchers in 
such questions as the structure of so-called real experience. Some are convinced that 
this is only a “structureless sequence of isolated events,”23 while others show that 
although maybe a structure of our real actions “is not necessarily narrative structure,” 
there is “a kinship between the means-end structure of action and the beginning-
middle-end structure of narrative.”24 Alternatively, they refer to Husserl’s analysis of 
the consciousness of internal time to prove that in our real experience there is also 
a continuity because putatively completely isolated events “(...) are charged with the 
significance they derive from our retentions and protentions”25 and so on. In a word, 
there is no compelling, ultimate proof that real life is chaotic and narration is always 
organised and ordered. 
Ultimately, as Carr puts it , the only “real difference between “art” and “life” is 
not organisation vs. chaos, but rather the absence in life of that point of view which 
transforms events into a story by telling them.”26 In short, in the real, empirical world 
there is simply no narrator, no person or subject who gathers together everything 
that is happening and recounts it as a complete whole, a story with a beginning, 
middle and end. There is no one to explain the final moral and the sense which lets 
us answer the question of why all this suffering, grief, war, work etc. were done and 
experienced. Even if such an Ideal Narrator exists somewhere, we cannot contact 
him or her and ask for an explanation of the purposes and endeavours. We may only 
wait and believe (or not) that when everything ends some day in the future we will 
understand his reasons and that somewhere over there (for example in Plato’s world 
of ideas and so on) there exists some transcendental, absolute basis or justification of 
a whole story which is not completely irrational and absurd and is not reduced to this 
tale which is being told. 
As for our personal narrative, we are in an incomparably better situation because 
here there is no doubt that we ourselves are occupying “the story-tellers’ position 
with respect to our own lives.”27 As reflective entities or, as Taylor formulated it, 
“self-interpreting animals,” we are at the same time agents (characters who act) and 
narrators who are all the time “literally telling, to others and to ourselves, what we 
are doing.”28 As Carr puts it, “such narrative activity” which accompanies our actions 
“is a constitutive part of action, and not just an embellishment, commentary, or other 
incidental accompaniment. (...) I am the subject of a life-story which is constantly 
being told and retold in the process of being lived. I am also the principal teller of this 
tale, and belong as well to the audience to which it is told.”29 
This is a reason why our personal life-story, although – like every narrative – it 
has origins in a collective mythology and – at least to some extent – depends on 
23 D. Carr, op.cit., p. 122. 
24 Ibidem, p. 122. 
25 Ibidem, p. 122. 
26 Ibidem, p. 124. 
27 Ibidem, p. 125. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Ibidem, pp. 125–126. 
304
various narrative patterns and ready social images or expectations which “constitute” 
and “(...) create meaning rather than reflecting or imitating something that exists 
independently of it,”30 in spite of that may still have the chance to remain reflective 
and to be treated as a practical, ethical or moral activity “in the broad sense used by 
Alasdair MacIntyre and derived ultimately from Aristotle.”31 As Kim Atkins puts it, 
“(...) the narrative conception of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive 
account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of per-
sonal identity because only the narrative model preserves the first-person perspective, 
which is essential to an ethical perspective.”32 In other words, only by speaking from 
the first-person perspective, so important in a narrative model of personality (impor-
tant because an autobiographical narration which is one and the same as somebody’s 
narrative identity cannot be told by anybody else than an individual him- or herself), 
may we fully realise our potential of being ethical, rational entities, and may become 
really moral subjects, those who are able to make free, autonomous choices. Only by 
taking such a point of view of a particular but at the same time conscious person may 
we avoid a danger related to the “magical” tendency described above, characteristic 
of every narrative which lets us consider various events or actions as ready wholes 
given from above, as something which must necessarily happen. 
This is possible because a conscious, reflective and consequently inwardly free 
individual can accept a given pattern of thinking or refuse it deciding in an always 
to some extent free way how and according to which narrative scheme to understand 
or to interpret given circumstances or facts. This possibility does not exist either in 
a mythology itself (in a world in which only a mythological consciousness functions, 
not a reflective one), nor in a fictional world of invented, literary narrations, in which 
characters and heroes are, as Williams puts it , always “given wholes,” they are not 
living, “they have no future” and “all of them is already there”: “When the reader 
starts, and in that sense when they start, they are already finished.”33 This is the rea-
son why they are nor free and remain fully an element of a myth while a real, alive 
person, someone who has a reflective consciousness, may in spite of that keep an 
autonomy and a freedom of choice, never becoming entirely a hostage of somebody’s 
or even his/her own mythology.34 
30 Ibidem, p. 126. 
31 Ibidem. 
32 K. Atkins, Narrative Identity, Practical Identity and Ethical Subjectivity [in:] “Continental Phi-
losophy Review” 2004, vol. 37, No. 3, p. 341. About the ethical aspects of a narrative identity see also 
P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, translated by K. Blamey, Chicago and London 1994, p. 163 and further. 
33 B. Williams, op.cit., p. 311, 310. 
34 Such an ethical first-person perspective corresponds well with Schelling’s idea of a dialectics of 
mythology and revelation according to which a revelation is the second part of a creative process and 
takes place in  the  f ace  o f  mythology (its first, creative part, a recurrence of a nature process in human 
consciousness). An ethical point of view always assumes a reflective consciousness, a freedom of choice 
and an individual autonomy, and this is a reason why it may appear only when mythology is losing its 
power of impact on human minds, when people are no longer under the influence of such a “Dionysian” 
passion which was necessary to generate all mythological images (for a dialectics of mythology and 
revelation in Schelling’s thought, see for example F.W.J. Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Of-
fenbarung, Teilband 1, W. E. Ehrhardt (Hrsg.), Hamburg 1992, lecture 1; for the problem of the to some 
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Summing up, although our narrative identity – like every narrative – has its origins in 
a collective, mythological tale which is a basis of our culture and all patterns of think-
ing available in a given culture system, by acting and sometimes also judging we 
may in spite of that remain free, and are not determined to choose just such an option 
of being or thinking which is a direct consequence of a mythological consciousness 
and is fully a part of a collective myth. It is true that our personal life stories, and as 
a consequence also we as individuals, are shaped by it, but this does not mean that 
we entirely belong to such a mythological reality and cannot retain the ability to live 
a life which is reflective, responsible and non-fictive. 
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